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This appeal seeks to reverse a judgment sustaining a
family settlement agreement materially altering the estate plan of
Edward Miller Grimm reflected in his wills and a spendthrift trust
despite Mr. Grimm's widow and their childrens' uncontroverted and
unequivocal repudiation of the coercively obtained settlement
arrangement years prior to court approval and, indeed, years prior
to any petition seeking court approval.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Igsuss With Rgqgrd to Repudiation
1.

Whether a court has the power pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 to approve a family settlement
agreement materially altering the disposition of an estate under an
inter vivos spendthrift trust and wills when the settlement
arrangement has been unequivocally repudiated by the Trustor's and
Testator's beneficiaries prior to court approval and prior to the
filing of any petition seeking court approval.
2.

Whether the lower court erroneously and improperly

concluded: "The Family Settlement Agreement was not subject to
repudiation without legal consequences prior to approval by the
court.

Failure to obtain court approval does not invalidate the

Family Settlement Agreement.

The Family Settlement Agreement could

be presented to the court for approval at any time prior to
distribution and closing of the estate."

(Conclusion No. 8, CR.

1232).
Issue With Regard to Spendthrift Trust
3.

Whether a court can approve a family settlement

agreement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102
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terminating or materially altering an inter vivos spendthrift
trust for the support and maintenance of the widow of the trustor.
Issue With Regard to Notice
4.

Whether the court can approve a family settlement

agreement materially altering a will of Edward Miller Grimm when
on the uncontroverted facts there has been no notice to two
co-executors of Mr. Grimm's Philippine will/ Charles Parsons and
Byron S. Huie# as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c).
Issues With Regard to Right to Jury Trial
5.

Whether the plaintiffs, Maxine# Peter and Linda

Grimm/ have a right to jury trial on the issues of duress and
failure of consideration when the defendants, Ethel Roberts and
Juanita Morris, counterclaimed for breach of contract of the
family settlement agreement and sought damages of $10,000,000 and
the plaintiffs pled duress and failure of consideration as
affirmative defenses as required by Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to the counterclaim.
6.

Whether the plaintiff/ Maxine Grimm/ was denied her

right to jury trial on her claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress when the court dismissed the jury at the close
of the evidence.
7.

Whether plaintiffs, Maxine, Peter and Linda Grimm/

were wrongfully denied their right to jury trial on their claims
and defenses with regard to the family settlement agreement when
the court impaneled a jury under a bench ruling in which the court
stated:

M

I never questioned the right to your trial by jury for
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legal issues.

There is no problem with that . . . .

We can

impanel a jury, but the court will still make the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the contracts are valid or invalid.
Then the jury can decide the legal issues. . . . H

(July 26-30/

1985 TR. at 19). "Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the court will make
the decision as to whether or not the family settlement agreement
is valid or invalid, and then based upon that you may proceed on
your counterclaim —

you may not proceed, but at that time the

plaintiffs here cannot say that thev didn't have the right for the
iurv to hear all of the defenses with regard to coercion, duress
and other defenses . . . .H (July 26-30, 1985 TR. at 23). And
then at the close of evidence dismissed the jury and eight months
later entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
including findings and conclusions on the issues of failure of
consideration and duress.
Issues With Regard to the Court's Findings and Conclusions
A.

Failure of Consideration.
8.

Whether the forbearance of the defendants' cal-

culated campaign "to cause trouble" in the probate and administration of Mr. Grimm's estate was adequate consideration for a family
settlement agreement or constituted a good faith controversy under
the Uniform Probate Code.
9.

Whether the court improperly concluded that fore-

bearance of claims could furnish adequate consideration for a
family settlement agreement regardless of whether any claim of the
defendants to Mr. Grimm's estate was a bona fide or reasonable

-3-

claim or, as the court phrased it in its Findings and
Conclusions:

"It was not necessary to find whether they [the

defendants' claims] were or were not unfounded.-

(Finding No.

65C, CR. 1236).
10.

Whether there was a failure of consideration for the

family settlement agreement when the defendants on the
uncontroverted facts did not have and did not assert any
reasonable or bona fide claim to participate in Mr. Grimm's estate
beyond what Mr. Grimm desired to give them under his estate plan
reflected in his wills and spendthrift trust.
B.

Duress, Failure of Consideration and Good Faith Controversy
11.

Whether the court's findings and conclusions with

regard to duress, failure of consideration and good faith
controversy

were clearly erroneous, inadequate and contrary to the

documentary evidence and the testimony of the defendants.
C.

Fundamental Inadequacy of Court's Findings.
12.

Whether the court's findings adopted virtually

verbatim from those proposed by the defendants on the issues of
duress, coercion, waiver, ratification, failure of consideration and
good faith controversy are not only clearly erroneous, but in their
consistent disregard of the evidentiary record, including the
exhibits and the defendants' own testimony, demonstrate a
fundamental abdication of the court's responsibility to fairly
adjudicate and find the facts subject to its determination.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The sections of the Uniform Probate Code controlling
court approval of a family settlement agreement are set forth in
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102.

These sections are set

forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Parties, the Nature of the Case and the Course of
Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court.
Edward Miller Grimm died on November 27, 1977 in Manila,

Republic of the Philippines.
Mr. Grimm left a large estate with a value at the time of
his death in excess of $8,000,000.

(DX-272).

He disposed of his

estate under two wills and an inter vivos spendthrift trust.
(PX-6, 7, 11).
Mr. Grimm was survived by his widow, Maxine Tate Grimm,
their two children, Linda and Pete Grimm, and by two children of a
prior marriage, Ethel Grimm Roberts and Juanita Grimm Morris.
The plaintiffs, Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm, and the
defendants, Ethel Roberts, Juanita Morris and their mother, Mr.
Grimm's first wife, Juanita Kegley Grimm, entered into a family
settlement agreement (FSA) on April 25, 1978.

(PX-58, 59). The

FSA materially altered the disposition Mr. Grimm had made of his
estate under his wills and trust.

(Compare PX-6, 7, 11 with

PX-58, 59).
The plaintiff-appellants are Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm
and E. LaVar Tate, Mrs. Grimm's brother and her co-executor of
what is referred to as Mr. Grimm's non-Philippine will.
(Plaintiffs).
The defendant-respondents are Ethel Roberts and Juanita
Morris, Juanita Kegley Grimm, and Rex Roberts, the second husband
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of Ethel Roberts/ whom she married in 1969,

(Defendants).

The course of the proceedings in the court below were
unusual.
This appeal arises from a consolidated action.

The

actions that were consolidated were originally a probate
proceeding denominated In the Matter of the Estate of Edward
Miller Grimm, Probate No. 3720, and a civil action, Maxine Tate
Grimm, et. al. v. Ethel Grimm Roberts, et. al.. Civil No.
C-80-0322.

Both actions were filed in the Third Judicial District

Court of Tooele County and were consolidated by order of the court
of January 20, 1981.

(CR. 194). 1

The probate proceeding insofar as it affects this consolidated action, was commenced by Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris
filing a petition to remove Maxine Grimm and LaVar Tate as the
supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate on May
16, 1980.

The petition sought to have Maxine and her brother

Although the actions were consolidated, the Tooele County
Clerk's office continued to maintain separate files in the probate
and civil actions and some original papers were filed in one file
and some in the other even though all original papers after the
order of consolidation were appropriately styled to show that they
were filed in the consolidated action. The Tooele County Clerk's
office in paginating and indexing the record pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, has paginated and indexed
two separate records, one for the original papers that the Clerk's
office filed in the probate action and one for the original papers
the Clerk's office filed in the civil action. Since the Clerk's
office has maintained the record in this manner, citations to the
record will refer to "PR." for original papers filed, indexed and
paginated by the Clerk's office in the probate action and "CR." for
the civil action.
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removed as supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's
estate, to have Valley Bank & Trust Company appointed as a special
administrator and to have Mrs. Grimm and Mr. Tate render an
accounting.

The petition did not seek or request in any way that

the court approve the family settlement agreement, nor did it ask
for a distribution of Mr. Grimm's estate in accordance with the
family settlement agreement.

The petition speaks for itself.

(PR. 84-81).
Maxine Grimm and LaVar Tate responded to the probate
petition to remove them as personal representatives by filing an
answer and counterclaim on September 10, 1980.

(PR. 236-152).

Simultaneously, on September 10, 1980, the plaintiffs commenced
the civil action by filing a complaint against the Roberts, Mrs.
Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.

(CR. 101-1).

The complaint and

counterclaim alleged substantially parallel claims and fundamentally attacked the validity of the FSA.
236-152).

(CR. 101-1, PR.

The complaint sought to set aside the FSA on numerous

grounds, including duress, failure of consideration, material
alteration of a spendthrift trust, and the failure of the
defendants to submit the FSA for court approval pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102.

(Pltfs Complaint, Second

Cause of Action, CR. 86, Fifth Cause of Action, CR. 79, Sixth
Cause of Action, CR. 78, and Tenth Cause of Action, CR. 74).
The complaint also alleged a cause of action by Mrs.
Grimm against the Roberts and Mrs. Morris for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (Pltfs Complaint, Eleventh Cause
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of Action, CR. 72) and sought compensatory and punitive damages on
that cause of action.
In February of 1981, after consolidation, the defendants
answered the complaint (CRo 203-195) and replied to the counterclaim (CR. 212-204).

The defendants, again, did not in any way

seek court approval of the FSA.

(Id.).

In fact, the defendants

did not seek court approval of the FSA until 4 years later when
the defendants obtained leave to file an amended answer and
counterclaim on February 13, 1985.

(CR. 362, 373-372).

In their

counterclaim the defendants for the first time sought court
approval of the FSA.

(PR. 1634).

In addition, Ethel and Juanita

also counterclaimed against Maxine, Pete and Linda for breach of
the FSA and sought damages wby reason of the breach of the
FSA . . . in an amount . . . estimated to be $10,000,000.w
1632).

(PR.

The plaintiffs in reply to the counterclaim for breach of

contract set up as affirmative defenses, as required by Rule 8(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, their defenses of duress and
failure of consideration.

(CR. 948-941).

The plaintiffs made a timely demand for trial by jury.
(CR. 873-871).

The defendants objected and the court after

briefing and argument issued a bench ruling.
should speak for itself.

The court's ruling

The court in its ruling stated:

I never questioned the right to your trial by jury
for legal issues. There's no problem with that
...
We can impanel a jury, but the court will
still make the ultimate decision as to whether the
contracts are valid or invalid. Then the jury can
decide on the legal issues.
The court will make the decision and have the jury
sit through the whole case, hear the issues with
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regard to duress, coercion as to how they apply,
if we get beyond the determination of whether or
not the contracts are valid. That is the first
issue. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR at 19).
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the
court will make the decision as to whether or not
the family settlement agreement is valid or invalid, and then based upon that you may proceed on
your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at
that time the plaintiffs here cannot say that they
didn't have the right for the jury to hear all of
the defenses with regard to coercion, duress and
other defenses. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at
23).
The plaintiffs made it clear to the court that their
right to jury trial extended to Maxine's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at 7) and to
the issues of duress and failure of consideration.

(Id. at 22).

"There are questions, your Honor, that go to the validity of the
family settlement agreement which are duress and failure of consideration that in my view, your Honor, the court cannot determine
in face of the demand for jury trial."

1985.

(Id.).

Trial in the consolidated action commenced on August 6,
2
A jury was impaneled. (TRA. 3). After 9 days of

2

The transcript of the trial was transcribed by two different
reporters. The first reporter transcribed the first 3 volumes of
the transcript and paginated the transcript from page 1 in Volume I
to page 527 in Volume III. The second reporter transcribed the remaining 6 volumes of the transcript and paginated those volumes from
page 1 in Volume IV to page 1127 in Volume IX. Since the pagination
of the transcript does not read in consecutive numbered order for
the entire transcript, the first 3 volumes of the transcript are
referred to as MTRAH and the last 6 volumes of the transcript as
H
TRB.M For example, TRB-100 refers to page 100 of Volume IV of the
transcript.
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trial at the close of the evidence the court simply ruled: "The
court finds the case in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs" and dismissed the jury.

(TRB. 1125).

The court gave absolutely no reasons for its decision nor
did the court indicate the procedure —

whether it was deciding

the case on the merits, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b)
or a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50.

The court

stated that it would "submit a memorandum as to my decision."
(TRB. 1125).

The court did not do so.

Eight months later the court entered its findings and
conclusions of law adopted virtually verbatim, including
typographical errors, from those proposed by the defendants (CR.
1254-1231) and entered its judgment (CR. 1258-1255).
The court's judgment simply approved the FSA pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 and summarily denied the
parties all other relief on their complaint and counterclaim,
including the removal of Mrs. Grimm and Mr. Tate as personal
representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate and the defendants' demand
for an accounting.

(CR. 1258-1255).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This statement of facts sets forth the essential facts
with regard to the creation of Mr. Grimm's estate plan, how that
plan five months after his death came to be materially altered by
the FSA and the unequivocal repudiation of the FSA by Mr. Grimm's
primary beneficiaries, his widow and their children.
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Since the court below entered findings, this statement
focuses on the documentary exhibits and the testimony of the
defendants and their witnesses.

Most of this evidence, including

the defendants' own evidence, is simply omitted from the court's
findings or encompassed in ultimate findings such as, "The
defendants did not know that the claims they asserted were
unfounded" (Finding 65C at CR. 1236); or "None of the plaintiffs
were put in such fear as to overcome their free will" (Finding 65D
at CR. 1235).
A.

Edward Miller Grimm. His Family, His Career, and His Estate
Plan.
Edward Miller Grimm lived a successful and colorful

life.

He was one of the early American businessmen in the Far

East and developed a successful stevedoring business in Manila
before the Second World War.

(TRA. 18-19, 23-24).

He married Juanita Kegley Grimm on February 22, 1926.
They had two children, Ethel Grimm Roberts and Juanita Grimm
Morris.

(CR. 1253).

The family resided in the Philippines until

1937 when Juanita Kegley Grimm took her children and returned to
the United States.

(Id.)

During the Second World War Mr. Grimm served as a Colonel
on General Douglas MacArthur's staff.
ible for logistics.

(TRA. 11). He was respons-

(TRA. 11). Maxine served as a recreational

director for the American Red Cross and met Mr. Grimm in the
Philippines late in the war.

(TRA. 11-12).

After the War, Mr. Grimm obtained a divorce from Juanita
Kegley Grimm.

(PX-1, 2, 3). Mr. Grimm established residency in
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Nevada for the purpose of obtaining a divorce and filed an action
for divorce.

(PX-1).

Juanita appeared in the action arid filed a

cross-complaint for divorce.

(PX-2).

After trial, she was

awarded a divorce by a decree of divorce on June 2, 1947.

(PX-3).

Mr. Grimm married Maxine on June 25, 1947 in Tooele,
Utah.
10).

(PX-5).

They had two children, Pete and Linda.

(TRA.

Pete was born November 20, 1951, and Linda was born February

28, 1953.

(TRA. 10). Prior to Mr. Grimm entering the hospital in

October of 1977, no one in 30 years had ever raised any question
as to the validity of Mr. Grimm's divorce or his marriage to
Maxine.

(TRA. 10, 103).
Edward and Maxine had a strong and happy marriage.

(TRA.

19, 25). They maintained residences in the Philippines and in
Tooele, Utah, and traveled extensively.

(CR. 1252).

Although,

they spent most of their time in the Philippines until the last
two years of Mr. Grimm's life when they spent more time in Tooele
(TRA. 28), Mr. Grimm remained an American citizen.

(TRA. 9, TRB.

15).
Shortly after Mr. Grimm's remarriage, Ethel, too, moved
to the Philippines where she still resides with her husband, Rex.
(TRA. 26-27, 464). Juanita remained in the United States and now
lives in California with her family.

(TRA. 27; TRB. 1079).

Prior

to Mr. Grimm entering the hospital in October of 1977, Maxine had
maintained good relationships with Ethel, Nita and their families,
although, of course she did not see Nita and her family as often
as she did the Roberts and Ethel's children.
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(TRA. 27, 483-84).

Mr. Grimm's children described him as a strong and
gracious man who was "very independent."

(TRA. 477; TRB. 408).

Ethel described Maxine as a loving, kind and religious person,
whose family was her whole life.

(TRA. 484-85).

After the war, Mr. Grimm successfully rebuilt his businesses with his long time partner, Charles Parsons.
20-21).

(TRA.

Mr. Grimm and Mr. Parsons concentrated their business

activities in stevedoring, shipping and molasses ventures in the
Far East, including the Philippines, Hong Kong and Japan.
20-22).

(TRA.

Together they owned and operated numerous enterprises,

including Femola, GP and Hong Kong Transportation.

(Id.).

Mr.

Grimm also owiied an American company, Globe Investment Company,
with substantial assets.

(DX-272, TRA. 433).

Mr. Grimm disposed of his estate under two wills and an
inter vivos spendthrift trust.

(PX-6, 7, 11). The two wills were

executed in 1959 and the spendthrift trust in July of 1977.
(PX-6, 7, 11). Mr. Grimm executed his two wills while he was in
San Francisco in 1959.

(PX-6, 7; TRB. 1101-02).

One will, characterized as his non-Philippine will, disposed of all of Mr. Grimm's property/ both real and personal/ outside of the Philippine Islands.

(PX-6).

His Philippine will/ on

the other hand/ disposed of all of Mr. Grimm's property situate in
the Philippine Islands.

(PX-7).

Under the non-Philippine will/ Mr. Grimm left his estate
to Maxine/ Pete and Linda.

(PX-6).

He explicitly made no provi-

sion for Ethel and Juanita under his non-Philippine will and
appointed LaVar and Maxine as co-executors.
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(PX-6).

Under Mr, Grimm's Philippine will, Mr. Grimm left 61.5%
of his estate subject to that will to Maxine and divided the bulk
of the remainder of his estate among his four children, Ethel,
Nita, Pete and Linda.

(PX-7, 169D; TRB. 697).

The gift to Mr. Grimm's children under his Philippine
will in amount was measured by what is known as the Law of
Legitime.

(PX-7; TRB. 344-45, 359-60, 368). The Law of Legitime

in civil code countries is a law establishing the rights of compulsory heirs in a decedent's estate.

Children as well as the

wife are compulsory heirs under the Law of Legitime.

(TRB. 343).

The Law of Legitime, however, and its compulsory heir provisions
were not applicable to Mr. Grimm's estate regardless of whether he
was domiciled in Utah or in the Philippines.

(TRB. 359-60,

344-45, 368). Under Philippine law and specifically Art. 16 of
the Philippine Civil Code, the Law of Legitime is simply inapplicable to foreign nationals, whose rights of succession are determined by the law of their nationality.

(TRB. 359-60; PX-180).

As

a consequence, Mr. Grimm's children had no compulsory interest in
Mr. Grimm's estate under the Law of Legitime and Mr. Grimm was
free to determine what, if anything, he wished to leave his
children.

(Id.).

Under the Philippine will, Mr. Grimm designated Byron S.
Huie and his long-time partner, Charles Parsons, as co-executors
with Maxine.

(PX-7).

Rex Roberts testified Mr. Parsons had not

been given notice and there was no evidence —

none —

Mr. Huie

had been given notice that the defendants were seeking court
approval of the FSA.

(TRB. 992-93).
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numerous additional assets to the trust, including his interest in
Femola (PX-19) and Hong Kong Transportation Company.

(PX-22).

Each one of the transfers was reflected in a written assignment
signed by Mr. Grimm and notarized by Judge Tiongson.
TRB. 444, 449-50).

(PX-14-55;

Each one of the assignments was delivered by

Mr. Grimm to Pete as trustee of the trust.

(TRB. 450, 448-49).

The uncontroverted evidence, including Ethel's testimony,
was that Mr. Grimm was clearly competent at the time he executed
the trust.

(TRA. 19, 44, 480, 482; TRB. 442).

Mr. Grimm did not transfer to the trust a receivable involving the Everett Steamship Company which he had realized as a
dividend upon the sale of Luzon Stevedoring in 1964.

(TRB. 449;

DX-267 at 2). The Everett Steamship receivable, a Philippine
asset, was a receivable for three payments in the amount of
approximately $984,000 each due on June 30, 1978, June 30, 1979
and June 30, 1980.

(CR. 1250).

Even after the creation of the

trust, the Everett Steamship receivable was still subject to Mr.
Grimm's Philippine will.

(CR. 1250).

The court received in evidence uncontroverted summaries
of Mr. Grimm's estate plan prepared by Merrill Norman, a C.P.A.
(TRB. 672-751; PX-169, 169A-1690).

Under Mr. Grimm's estate plan,

100% of the assets under the trust, 50% of the assets under the
non-Philippine will, and 61.5% of the assets under the Philippine
will were all dedicated to the maintenance and support of Maxine.
(PX-169D).

In total, after taxes, debt and administration costs,

88.6% of Mr. Grimm's entire estate was dedicated to Maxine's maintenance and support.

(PX-169E).

Mr. Grimm gave Pete and Linda
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alive,

best of your knowledge a list of all known
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would like to have this by Monday at the latest.
Maxine, I hope that we will be able to work
out something that will not involve court
procedure. We both understand what this will
mean, but I can see that you are giving us no
other option. (PX-70).
Maxine as a result of Ethel's demand, asked that a new
will be prepared for Mr. Grimm's consideration dividing one-half
of Mr. Grimm's estate equally between Ethel, Nita, Pete and Linda
so that if Mr. Grimm wanted to he could change his estate plan and
execute a new will.

(TRA. 233; TRB. 426-27, 544). The will did

not arrive before Mr. Grimm died (TRA. 233; TRB. 426-27) and the
subject of a new will was never discussed with him before his
death.
C.

(TRA. 451, 233).

The Roberts' Campaign to Coerce Maxine into a Family
Settlement Agreement.
After Mr. Grimm's death Ethel and Rex undertook a cam-

paign to illegally gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate and to intimidate Maxine into signing a settlement.
In December of 1977, Maxine returned with Linda to Tooele
for a second funeral and Mr. Grimm's burial.

(TRA. 75-76).

She

remained in Utah from early December, 1977 until February 22, 1978
when she returned to the Philippines.

(TRA. 77, 121-22).

When

she left, she intended to promptly return to the Philippines and
disclosed her intention to Ethel.
Ethel did not wait.

(TRA. 76; TRB. 14).

While Maxine was absent from the

Philippines, Ethel caused herself to be appointed as special
administratrix for Mr. Grimm's estate.
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>x >3; TRA. 505-08) and Ethel
one miew Maxine believed there were

wills when she left the Philippines to return to Tooele for Mr.
Grimm's burial.

(TRA. 508).

The Robert's campaign did not stop with Ethel's appointment.

In January of 1978 they broke into Maxine's Philippine

home.

(TRB. 24, 18, 20, 636-37; TRA. 110-11, 113). Rex and Ethel

entered Maxine's home without Maxine's permission and removed the
contents of three safes, including gold and silver, removed one
large safe which they could not open and took Maxine's personal
papers, including credit cards and checkbook.
113-15; TRB. 20, 22-24, 636-37).

(PX-82, 85; TRA.

Ethel also removed property from

and asserted control over Mr. Grimm's office.

(DX-211; PX-84;

TRB. 28-29).
When Maxine learned of Ethel's appointment and the breakin, she wired Ethel and demanded that Ethel relinquish her
appointment as special administratrix on the ground that Mr. Grimm
had left wills and demanded the return of her property.
81).

(PX-88,

Rex, after the break-in, traveled from the Philippines to

Tooele and got copies in February of both wills.

(TRB. 639).

Even after Maxine's wire and after Rex returned with the wills and
showed them to Ethel, the Roberts refused to withdraw Ethel's
appointment as special administratrix and return the property they
had taken from Maxine's home.

(TRB. 639-41,11, 12; TRA. 118).

The Roberts told Maxine that they would not relinquish Ethel's
appointment or return her property until she signed a FSA (TRA.
118) and they did not do so.

(TRB. 936-37, 640-41, 11-12; DX-214;

TRA. 118).
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The Roberts attempted to achieve this demand by

repeatedly threatening (1) to claim Mr. Grimm's first divorce was
illegal and Maxine's marriage invalid; (2) to go to the tax
authorities, the BIR and IRS, and expose Mr. Grimm's tax problems;
and (3) to side with the Parsons and work against Maxine so as to
jeopardize the estate's 50% interest in Mr. Grimm's major
businesses.

(TRA. 122-23, 126-28; TRB. 466-67, 468-69, 470-71,

472, 231, 237; PX-95).
Ethel denied that she or Rex made any threats to Maxine
and claimed that Maxine entered into the FSA "voluntarily and out
of the goodness of her heart."

(TRB. 55-56).

said about Ethel's credibility.
that was a lie, wasn't it?

—

A word needs to be

She admitted she lied —

Yes."

"And

(TRB. 71). She lied about

paying a bribe to the Philippine taxing authorities.

(TRB. 71).

She testified categorically that no one ever said anything to
Maxine on the subject of the legality of Mr. Grimm's divorce or
the validity of his marriage to Maxine.
testified that was not true.

(TRB. 43-44).

He testified:

M

Q.

But, Rex

Did you tell

Mrs. Grimm in your wife's presence that her marriage to Mr. Grimm
may be invalid?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And did you at the same

time tell Mrs. Grimm that Mr. Grimm's divorce —
divorce from Juanita Grimm may be invalid?

A.

Mr. Grimm's
Correct.

(TRB.

644).
Mr. Roberts acknowledged the impact of that threat on
Maxine.

He testified that when he claimed Mr. Grimm's divorce was

illegal and Maxine's marriage was invalid, "that got the job
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best evidence of the impact on Maxine was not the testimony at
trial but the letter she wrote to David Salisbury on March 29,
1978, when she capitulated to the Roberts' demands.

She wrote:

I think it is most unfortunate that people have
to make decisions under stress. When I get one
minute to think I can see what has happened. I
have been pressured and threatened so much that I
am still in shock and probably will be til this
is all over and I get to the point where I would
say anything to end it all, and I think that is
what Rex is working on—I should say both of
them. (PX-95).
Although both sides had lawyers, the lawyers only played
a peripheral role in the settlement negotiation.
240-42, 245-46, 915; DX-308; PX-174).

(TRB. 236,

The lawyers, of course,

were in the United States (PX-174; DX-308), the parties in the
Philippines.

(PX-95, 190). Mr. Salisbury associated Philippine

counsel, a Mr. Angara, to assist him in handling the estate, but
Angara played no role in the negotiation of the FSA.

(TRB. 527).

The only thing the lawyers did prior to drafting the FSA
was to enter into a stipulation in the probate proceeding below
providing that Maxine and LaVar could be appointed supervised
personal representatives and reserving other issues for future
determination,

(DX-260; TRB. 236). The only substantive conver-

sation between Mr. Salisbury's and Mr. Holbrook's offices occurred
at a meeting on March 22, 1978.
898-900).

(PX-174; TRB. 231-32, 236,

At the meeting Mr. Holbrook raised a number of ques-

tions concerning the legality of the divorce and the validity of
the marriage, Mr. Grimm's competency to execute the trust and the
Roberts' readiness to cause trouble with the taxing authorities.
(TRB. 234-35).

Mr. Salisbury testified that in substance he was
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Their mother had been divorced from
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which she appeared and was represented h] f counsel,

(I'X-I, c" I).

No good faith argument could be made that her divorce from Mr,
Grimm was subject to collateral attack.
909).

Mr. Grimm's wills and trust were valid and the defendants

themselves admitted his competency.
482).

(DX-250, 252; TRB. 310,

(PX-6, 7, 11; TRA. 480,

Mr. Grimm was an American citizen and Ethel and Nita were

not compulsory heirs.

(TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368; PX-160).

The

defendants simply did not have a claim for more.
Certainly that was Mr. Salisbury's advice.

(TRB. 242,

243-44; 306). He was opposed to giving Ethel and Nita 25% of the
net estate.

(TRB. 242, 243-44).

He tried to get his clients to

permit him to negotiate a different deal but they refused.
242).

(TRB.

Pete, when he met with him on April 17, 1978, told Mr.

Salisbury that it was necessary to accept the 25% for Ethel and
Nita to end the Roberts' pressure on Maxine.

(TRB. 248-49,

493-94, 314).
After the basic deal had been struck in the Philippines,
Rex and Pete traveled to Utah to draft the final settlement agreement with the lawyers.

(PX-174; TRB. 245-47).

During the draft-

ing negotiations the parties negotiated issues such as having
Juanita Kegley Grimm become a party to the FSA (TRB. 136) and the
exclusion of certain bank accounts in Pete and Linda's names
totaling $86,000 from the settlement.

(PX-59; TRB. 507-08).

The

parties, however, did not attempt to renegotiate the basic deal —
the deal under which Ethel and Nita would receive 25% of the net
estate after taxes or the minimum guarantee to Maxine of $1.5
million that Rex had agreed to because he thought the estate was
so substantial that the guarantee would never come into play.
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1 ., =ii :! her share subject:

to the payment of taxes and expenses.
65-66).

(PX-58 at 8; TRB. 654-55,

Instead of getting 3.7% of their father's estate under

his estate plan, Ethel and Nita received 25%.
PX-169I with 169H).

(PX-58, 59; compare

Under the FSA Ethel and Nita instead of re-

ceiving $192,846.00 from their father's estate, were to receive
after the payment of taxes and expenses $1,277,038.00.
169C).

(PX-169B,

Ethel and Nita under the FSA were to get not only six

times the amount that their father intended to give them, they
were to receive substantially more than Pete or Linda.

(PX-169C).

David Salisbury became the attorney for the estate under
the FSA.
E.

(TRB. 249).

Maxine's Ordeal Continued After the FSA.
After the Grimm's signed the FSA, they worked under its

terms until the fall of 1979.
TRB. 558-59).

(TRA. 443, 446, 468-69, 208-09;

Estate taxes were paid (DX-272) and an Everett

Steamship payment was distributed pursuant to the provisions of
the FSA.

(DX-229).

Maxine, Pete and Linda operated under the FSA

because they did not want the Roberts to start in on Maxine
again.

(TRB. 504-05, 558-59, 435, 424-25; TRA. 208-09).
Maxine hoped the settlement with the Roberts would

protect her emotional and physical health.
wrong, her ordeal continued.

(TRA. 176). She was

(TRA. 176-77).

It is unnecessary to

recount all the disputes, incidents and accusations.
177-79).

(See, TRA.

Some were serious. Mr. Grimm had a pig farm in the

Philippines that was financially unsuccessful.

(TRA. 177). Rex

wanted the pig farm placed in bankruptcy in order to avoid paying
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(TRA. 206-07).

Mr. Salisbury called Maxine and told

her to pay the bribe (TRA. 207; TRB. 268-69) and Maxine gave the
money to Rex.

(TRA. 208; TRB. 938, 996). Mr. Salisbury admitted

he recommended that a bribe be paid.

(TRB. 268-69).

After Mr.

Salisbury directed Maxine to pay the bribe, Maxine lost all
confidence in him.

(TRA. 208). She retained new counsel, Bert

Rand of Washington, D.C., and told him that she wanted to
repudiate the FSA.
F.

(TRA. 208-09).

The Grimms Repudiated the FSA.
There is absolutely no question that Maxine and her

children repudiated the FSA years —

four years —

even submitted to the court for approval.

before it was

(TRA. 208-09, 441,

468-69; TRB. 424-25, 505; DX-283; PX-173; see Br. supra. 7-9).
Ethel testified that she knew Maxine was going to challenge the
validity of the FSA in the latter part of 1979.

(TRA. 468-69).

Mr. Salisbury testified that he became aware Hin a formal sense"
that Maxine, Pete and Linda were repudiating the FSA in Hearly
1980.M

(TRB. 274-75).

Letters from Mrs. Grimm's new counsel

reflect the repudiation.

(PX-173; DX-283).

The Roberts themselves acknowledged that no one had
sought approval of the FSA prior to this action.

(TRB. 656-57;

TRA. 475). Mr. Salisbury testified "As long as there was a
friendly relationship between all the parties, it is not unusual
in estates to have an agreed-upon distribution that you simply
file at the time you are ready to close the estate."

(TRB. 151).

But, there were no friendly relationships between these parties.
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The relationships were so bad that both in the fall of 1978 and
again in 1979, Mr. Salisbury prepared a written resignation and
contemplated resigning (DX-281; PX-153; TRB. 252-53).

Mr.

Salisbury acknowledged he did not file the FSA for court approval
even after he knew the parties were not getting along (TRB. 271)
and he testified that he did not in any way prevent Rex, Ethel or
Nita from seeking court approval.

(TRB. 272). In any event, Mr.

Holbrook had advised Rex to file the agreement with the probate
court.

(TRB. 994-95).

Even after this action was commenced, the

defendants and their counsel did not seek court approval of the
FSA until they filed their counterclaim with leave of court on
February 13, 1985.

(CR. 362, 373-372; Br. supra. 7-9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower court's holding that the FSA could not be
repudiated prior to court approval is flat wrong.

The holding is

contrary to settled authority, the plain language of the
controlling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101, and the basic
policy of the Uniform Probate Code favoring the effectuation of a
testator•s intent.
The Grimms uncontrovertedly repudiated the FSA years
before the lower court approved it and, indeed, years before the
defendants even petitioned for court approval.

The Rule is that a

settlement requiring court approval may be repudiated at anytime
prior to court approval. Mackey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Co., 312
S.E.2d 565 (S.C.App. 1984); Georaevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192,
197 (M.D.Pa. 1982), app. dismd., 722 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1983);
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Dacanav v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Rule is

consistently followed in all types of cases requiring court
approval of settlements from guardian ad litem litigation to class
actions and is reflected in the Digest, 15A C.J.S. Compromise &
Settlement. §§ 2, 8.
The application of the Rule to court approval of an FSA is
supported by the plain language of the controlling statute,
§ 75-3-1101.

Section 75-3-1101 explicitly provides, "A compromise

. . . if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that
purpose, is binding on the parties thereto. . . .H
means what it says.

The statute

Prior to court approval an FSA is not binding

and may be repudiated.
The Rule and the plain language of the statute are
reinforced by the editorial board comment to §§ 75-3-1101 and
1102.

The comment provides, HIf all competent persons with

beneficial interest or claims which might be affected by the
proposal . . . concur, a settlement scheme differing from that
otherwise governing the devolution may be substituted.H

If the

intended beneficiaries do not concur, there is no foundation for
court approval of a settlement agreement materially altering the
testator's estate plan and the intent of the testator should be
effectuated.

In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah

Adv. Rep. 3, at fn 3 (Sept. 15, 1986).

Using this Court's recent

decision in the Chasel case as the basis for a hypothetical, isn't
it clear that prior to court approval of the compromise agreement,
William Chasel would have been entitled to repudiate the FSA and
present the newly discovered will of his father for probate?
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Given

the repudiation of Mr. Grimm's intended beneficiaries prior to
court approval, there is no reason why the defendants and the court
should be permitted to override Mr. Grimm's desires and write a new
estate plan for the disposition of his property.
Independent of the Grimm's repudiation, the court may not,
under the Uniform Probate Code, approve a FSA materially altering
or terminating a spendthrift trust.

Absent the power of the court

to approve a FSA under the Uniform Probate Code, the law is clear
—

the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust, even by unanimous

consent, may not terminate or materially alter the trust.
Sundauist v. Sundauist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981); 4 Scott on
Trusts, § 337.2 (3rd ed. 1967).
The Rule does not change in the context of the Uniform
Probate Code.

The authorities have held that even where the courts

have power to approve a FSA, the courts will reject a FSA
terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust.

Heritage Bank-North

v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 395 A.2d 552 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1978); St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Conant, 499 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1973); Breault
v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, den., 385 U.S.
824 (1966).
There is no question this FSA terminated Mr. Grimm's
spendthrift trust.

The FSA approved by the lower court

specifically makes the assets of the trust subject to the FSA.

The

FSA requires that assets placed in trust for the support and
maintenance of Maxine and subject to its spendthrift clause will be
transferred to Ethel and Nita.
funds to pay Ethel and Nita.

There is simply no other source of

But the FSA did not merely require
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the transfer of the property placed in the spendthrift trust to
Ethel and Nita, the FSA distributes Mr. Grimm's estate outside of
the trust directly to his beneficiaries.

The FSA displaces the

trust, and distributes Mr. Grimm's property directly to all of the
parties to the FSA, including Maxine, Pete and Linda.

The court

simply has no power to frustrate Mr. Grimm's lawful and clear
purpose in providing for the protection of his widow and sanction
the very thing he sought to avoid by a spendthrift clause —

the

dissipation of his property that he had set aside for his wife's
care and support.
The Uniform Probate Code requires a court may only approve
an FSA "after notice to all interested persons . . . .M
75-3-1102(c).

The defendants failed to give the required notice.

Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie were appointed with Maxine as
co-executors of the Philippine will.

The Philippine will was

admitted to probate in the court below.

Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons

received notice of the petition to probate but received absolutely
no notice that the defendants or anyone else was seeking court
approval of an FSA as required by § 75-3-1102(c).
The lower court found all interested persons had received
notice.

The finding was a fabrication.

There was no evidence that

Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie had received any notice that the
defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA.

Indeed, the

only evidence with regard to notice was Rex Roberts' admission that
Mr. Parsons had not been given notice that the defendants were
seeking court approval.

(TRB. 992-93).

The requisite notice is

essential to the court's power to approve the FSA and the failure
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to give that notice alone requires reversal of the lower court's
j udgment.
This Court has held the right to jury trial in civil cases
is guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Art. 1, § 10.
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &
Implement, Inc. 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).

There were claims and

issues in this action on which the plaintiffs were entitled to a
jury trial.
Maxine alleged in her complaint and proved at trial a
claim for damages for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The lower court simply did not adjudicate that claim.

The lower court did not grant a motion for a directed verdict (TRB.
1121-1127) and the court did not enter any findings or conclusions
with regard to that claim.

(CR. 1254-1231).

Utah recognizes the tort for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress and has adopted the Restatement Rule.

Pentecost

v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985); Restatement (Second) of
Torts. § 46 (1965).

A plaintiff, as in any other tort claim for

damages, is entitled to a jury trial on a claim for damages for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Restatement (Second)

of Torts, § 46, comment h (1965).
Since the lower court did not adjudicate the plaintiffs'
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maxine
is entitled to a reversal and a jury trial on that claim.

If the

court had granted a directed verdict on that claim, which it did
not, a directed verdict, too, would be reversible error.
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The Grimms were also entitled to a trial by jury on the
issues of duress and failure of consideration.

After trial, the

lower court and not the jury decided the issues of duress and
failure of consideration.

It entered generalized findings on those

issues.
The plaintiffs in their complaint sought to set aside the
FSA in part on grounds of duress and failure of consideration.

The

defendants, however, also sued the plaintiffs on a $10,000,000
counterclaim for breach of contract and the Grimms in reply to the
counterclaim for breach of the FSA again pled duress and failure of
consideration, but as affirmative defenses under U.R.C.P. 8(c).
The pleadings, thus, set up the issues of duress and failure of
consideration both as claims and affirmative defenses.
If the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and
legal counterclaims, the preservation of the right to jury trial
requires that the legal claims be tried to a jury first.
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &
Implement, Inc., supra.: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).

No

one forced the defendants to plead a $10,000,000 counterclaim for
breach of contract, but when they pled that counterclaim, the
Grimms were entitled to a jury trial.
The lower court found adequate consideration for the FSA
from the defendants' forbearance of claims.

(CR. 1235).

further found there was a good faith controversy.

The court

The court,

however, made no attempt to determine whether the defendants had a
bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate.
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On the

contrary, the court concluded, "The defendants did not know that
the claims thev asserted were unfounded.

It is nbt necessary to

find whether they were or were not unfounded."
CR. 1236).

(Finding No, 65C,

Contrary to the legal standard adopted by the lower

court, only a bona fide or reasonable claim can provide
consideration for a FSA or form the foundation of a good faith
controversy.

Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d 784 (N. Car. 1981); In the

Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe. 420 N.E.2d 1024 (111.
1981); Warner v. Warner, 1 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1938).
The court not only adhered to an erroneous and improper
conclusion of law in reaching its determination on the issues of
consideration and good faith controversy, the defendants did not
have and did not assert any bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr.
Grimm's estate.

The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr.

Grimm's divorce was invalid, that Mr. Grimm's wills or trust were
invalid, or that they were compulsory heirs.

The defendants,

moreover, according to their testimony, never asserted any bona
fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate.

Their lawyer, Mr. Holbrook,

testified that he did not assert any claim on their behalf.

Rex

testified that while he threatened litigation, he did not know and
did not tell Pete or Maxine what kind of litigation would be
commenced, and Ethel, if she is to be believed, categorically
denied making any claim prior to the settlement agreement.
The court, thus, adhered not only to an improper rule of
law, but there was in fact a failure of consideration for the FSA
and no good faith controversy since the defendants did not have and
did not assert any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate.
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The lower court-s. findings specially and as a whole are an
abdication of the court's fundamental responsibility to fairly
adjudicate and determine the facts pursuant to Rule 52. The
principal failure of the lower court's findings is its consistent
refusal to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts relating to the
Roberts' conduct/ their calculated campaign to obtain a FSA, and
the impact of that campaign on Maxine.
The lower court made no findings with regard to whether
Ethel's petition to appoint herself as special administratrix was
based on perjurious allegations, whether her purpose in making the
petition was to gain control of her father's estate or whether she
refused to relinquish that appointment after demand.
The lower court made no findings with regard to whether
the Roberts' break-in and burglary of Maxine's home was pursuant to
their plan to force Maxine to agree to a FSA.
The lower court made no findings with regard to the
harassment, threats and intimidation of the Roberts during the 30
plus meetings between the Roberts and the Grimms in the Philippines
in March of 1978.

The lower court made no findings with regard to

the Roberts' threats, whether they threatened to claim Mr. Grimm's
divorce was illegal, his marriage invalid, whether the Roberts
threatened to cause trouble with the taxing authorities, or whether
the Roberts threatened to interfere with the Grimms' relationship
with the Parsons.

The lower court made no findings with regard to

Ethel and Rex's behavior or the impact of that behavior on Maxine.
How can a court assess the impact of conduct on Maxine
without determining what the conduct was?
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How can a court conclude

that there was no duress or coercion if it simply ignores the
perjurious abuse of process, break-in and constant threats and
intimidation?

How can the court decide the ultimate issue without

any finding on the critical, subsidiary or subordinate issues of
what the Roberts actually did to pressure Maxine into signing a FSA.
The long and short of it is the Roberts' conduct and the
court's findings are like two ships passing in the night, one
unaware of the other.

The fundamental inadequacy of the court's

findings alone requires a reversal.
ARGUMENT
A.

The FSA Under the Plain Language of U.C.A. § 75-3-1101 and
Settled Authority Could Be Repudiated Prior to Court Approval.
The lower court's holding that the FSA could not be

repudiated prior to court approval is flat wrong.
No. 8, CR-1232).

(See, Conclusion

The holding is contrary to settled authority and

the plain language of the controlling statute.
The plaintiffs uncontrovertedly repudiated the FSA not
only before, but years before the lower court approved it.
supra, at 6-8, 30-31).

The court acknowledged that.

(CR. 1236).

The court concluded repudiation was of no consequence.
1258-1256).

(Br.

(CR. 1232,

The court, however, cited no authority for its

conclusion that it could approve an FSA materially altering a
testator's desired disposition of his property over the unequivocal
opposition of the testator's intended beneficiaries, including the
testator's widow.

(Id.).

The failure of the lower court to cite any authority in
support of its position is no accident.
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There is none.

The Rule

is that a settlement agreement requiring court approval may be
repudiated at any time prior to court approval.

Mackey v.

Kerr-McGee Chemical Co., 312 S.E.2d 565 (S.C.App. 1984); Ferreira
v. Arrow Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 447 N.E.2d 1258 (Mass.App. 1983),
app. den., 451 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass. 1983); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Altman, 463 A.2d 829 (Md. 1983); Pepitone v. State Farm Mutual Ins,
Co., 346 So.2d 266, 268 (La.App. 1977); Vece v. De Biase, 197
N.E.2d 79 (111. App. 1964), app. dismd., 202 N.E.2d 482 (111.
1964); Georaevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 197 (M.D.Pa. 1982),
app. dismd., 722 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1983); Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573
F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Rule has been consistently

followed in the courts and has been followed in all types of cases
requiring court approval of settlement agreements.

Id.

The Rule

has been followed in workmen's compensation settlements, Mackey v.
Kerr-McGee, supra. (HThe Supreme Court indicated that the policies
supporting the requirement of approval also support the result that
settlement agreements are not binding until they have been
approved** at 567); guardian ad litem settlements, Dacanay v.
Mendoza, supra. (HWe hold that a guardian ad litem may repudiate a
settlement agreement prior to court approval- at 1079); will
contest settlements requiring probate court approval, Vece v. De
Biase, supra.; and class action settlements subject to court
approval under Rule 23(e), Georqevich v. Strauss, supra. (-However,
where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that the court
must be a party to and approve of the settlement agreement before
it may be consummated, any party may withdraw from the proposed
settlement agreement prior to the court's final approval thereof"
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at 197). The Rule is so settled that it is reflected in the
Digest, 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement, §§ 2, 8 ("Where a partyrepudiates the compromise agreement before it is approved or
confirmed by the court . . . the court should not confirm the
agreement" § 2 at 176).
The rationale of the Rule is predicated on statutory
language requiring court approval and the law of contracts, Dacanay
v, Mendoza, supra. ("And like any other contract wherein a party
lacks capacity, or when a required contractual formality has been
ignored, the contract is voidable until the defect is remedied" at
1080); and Georqevich v. Strauss, supra. ("In essence prior to the
court's approval of the proposed settlement agreement, there is no
more than an offer of compromise which is not binding and may be
withdrawn" at 197).
Certainly, the Rule is supported by the plain language of
the controlling statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101.

provides in material part:

§ 75-3-1101

"A compromise of any controversy as to

. . ., the rights or interest in the estate of the decedent, . . .,
if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that purpose,
is binding on all the parties thereto . . . ."
of the statute reflects the Rule —

The plain language

a family settlement agreement

is only binding after court approval in a formal proceeding for
that purpose.
language.

The lower court's ruling is contrary to the plain

That ruling necessarily holds that a settlement

agreement is "binding" —

it cannot be repudiated —

approval.
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prior to court

This Court's decision in the recent case, In the Matter of
the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Sept. 15, 1986),
supports the position that a FSA may be repudiated prior to court
approval.

In Chasel, there was an attempt to set aside a

settlement agreement after court approval pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-1101.

In holding that a FSA could not be set aside

after court approval, the court said:

H

Compromise agreements

authorized by Part II of the Probate Code must be approved in
formal proceedings.M

Id. at 4.

The corollary of the court's

language is that if a FSA is not approved, it is not binding.
hypothetical based on the facts of Chasel makes the point.

A

If

William Chasel had found the new will prior to court approval,
would there be any question he had the right to withdraw from the
FSA and rely on his father's will?
The Grimms not only repudiated the FSA prior to court
approval, they repudiated the FSA over four years prior to
defendants even seeking court approval.

(TRA. 468-69; TRB. 274-75;

PX-173; DX-283; PR-236-252; CR-101-1; see Br. supra, at 6-8). The
defendants' failure to seek court approval until 1985 is simply
reflected in their pleadings.

(Br. supra, at 6-8). In their

original probate petition the defendants did not seek court
approval of the FSA.

(PR-84-81).

In their answer and reply the

defendants did not seek court approval of the FSA.
212-204).

(CR-203-195,

The defendants did not seek court approval of the FSA

until they obtained leave to file an amended answer and
counterclaim on February 13, 1985, over four years after the Grimms
had repudiated the FSA.

(CR-362, 373-372).
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There is simply no way, given the language of the statute
and the Rule, that the Grimms should be held to have been bound to
a FSA for seven years after its execution and four years after its
repudiation.
than that.
parties.

The testator's intent is entitled to more respect

The estate at issue is not the property of the
It was the property of Mr. Grimm.

Mr. Grimm determined

the disposition of his property and his heirs.

His basic desire

was to provide for the maintenance and support of his wife of 30
years.

The comments to §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102 make clear that the

testator's intent is entitled to deference.

This court

acknowledged that in the Chasel case when it said:
effectuation of a testator's will."

"The law favors

In the Matter of the Estate of

Frank Chasel, supra, at fn. 3.

The facts in Chasel again provide

the basis for a hypothetical.

If the new will had been found prior

to court approval, wouldn't deference to the testator's intent
require that William Chasel have a right of repudiation prior to
court approval so that he could have the opportunity to probate his
father's will?
The plaintiffs having unequivocally repudiated the FSA
prior to court approval and prior to the defendants' petition for
court approval, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed
with instructions to enter a judgment that the FSA has been
repudiated and is of no further force and effect.
B.

Regardless of Repudiation, the Court Erred in Approving the FSA
Materially Altering or Terminating a Spendthrift Trust.
Edward Miller Grimm's trust by its terms was a spendthrift

trust.

The trust categorically precluded transfer or hypothecation
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of any beneficiary's interest in the income or principal of the
trust.

(PX-11 at 9). The spendthrift clause supported the clear

purpose and structure of the trust in providing for the support and
maintenance of Maxine as the primary beneficiary of the trust.

(See

Br. supra. 15, 16-17).
The court made no findings —

none —

relating to whether

the trust was a spendthrift trust or Mr. Grimm's purpose in
establishing the trust.

(CR-1254-1231).

In short, the court did

not even address the issue of whether under the Uniform Probate Code
a court could approve a FSA materially altering or terminating a
spendthrift trust for the primary benefit of the trustor's widow.
Absent court approval of a FSA under the Uniform Probate
Code, the law is clear —

the beneficiaries of a trust even by

unanimous consent may not terminate or materially alter a trust if
such termination or alteration would frustrate a material purpose of
the trust.

Sundauist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981).

This

Rule, as this Court acknowledged, is supported "by a multitude of
authorities.H

Sundquist v. Sundquist, supra, at 187; see, 4 Scott

on Trusts. § 337 (3d ed. 1967).

One of the clearest applications of

this Rule is where the Rule is applied to preclude the termination
of a spendthrift trust.

4 Scott on Trusts, § 337.2.

The Rule does not change in the context of the Uniform
Probate Code.

Decisions have held that even where courts have power

to approve a family settlement agreement, the courts will reject a
FSA terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust.

Heritage

Bank-North v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 395 A.2d 552 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1978); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Conant, 499 S.W.2d 761 (Mo.
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1973); Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
den., 385 U.S. 824 (1966); Rose v. Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 238
N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931).

Each of these cases squarely holds that a

court with statutory power to approve a FSA will not approve a FSA
terminating or materially modifying a spendthrift trust.

Id.

In

Heritage Bank, for example, the court rejected a family compromise
stating:
Obviously, since the material purpose of a
spendthrift trust is to prevent anticipation or
control of future income or corpus by the protected
income beneficiary, acceleration of the trust would
directly contravene testator's intent.
Heritage Bank-North v. Hunterdon Med. Center, supra, at 554.
These same authorities further hold that even without an explicit
spendthrift clause a trust for the primary support and maintenance
of a beneficiary, such as a widow, is not terminable by a compromise
agreement (Id. at 554) on the ground Hthe obligation of the courts
to implement testamentary intent supersedes in these circumstances
the general public policy favoring dispute settlement.H

Id. at 555.

Under this line of authority, regardless of the Grimm's
repudiation, the court should have rejected the FSA because it
terminated and materially modified Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust.
There is no question that the FSA terminated or materially modified
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust.

The FSA approved by the lower court

specifically makes the assets of the trust subject to the FSA.
(PX-59, 58). The FSA requires that assets placed in the trust for
the support and maintenance of Maxine and subject to the spendthrift
clause of the trust will be transferred to Ethel and Nita.
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(Compare

PX-169C with 169B; PX-58, 59; see Br. supra, at 27-28).

There is

simply no other source for the additional $1,000,000 plus that Ethel
and Nita pick up under the FSA.

(Compare PX-169C with 169B).

But

the FSA doesn't merely require the transfer of property placed in a
spendthrift trust by Mr. Grimm to Ethel and Nita, the FSA
distributes Mr. Grimm's estate outside of his trust directly to his
beneficiaries.

(PX-58, 59). The FSA displaces the trust and,

contrary to Mr. Grimm's desires, his property is distributed not in
trust, not with the protection of the spendthrift clause for his
beneficiaries, but directly to the parties to the FSA, including
Maxine, Pete and Linda.

(PX-58 at 8, 9).

Candor requires that appellants acknowledge that the*
Restatement of Trusts adopts a modified rule.

Section 75-3-1101 of

Utah's Uniform Probate Code provides in part "an approved compromise
is binding even though it may effect a trust or an inalienable
interest."

The Restatement's position is that a compromise

agreement terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust will not be
effective "unless approved by the court as in the best interest of
the beneficiary."
(1959).

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment O

The rationale of the Restatement is that a court should be

able to approve a compromise under which a beneficiary surrenders a
part of his interest under a spendthrift trust, since if a bona fide
will contest were successful, the beneficiary's "interest might be
destroyed altogether."

Id.

But, even if the lower court could have

approved the FSA under the standard of the Restatement, it could
only have done so if it found that the compromise was in Maxine's,
Pete's and Linda's best interest.
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This FSA was hardly in their

interest.

Ethel and Nita had no bona fide claim that jeopardized

the Grimms* position under the trust.

The Grimms did not benefit by

the Roberts' blackmail and, in any event, the court made absolutely
no findings that would support court approval under the "best
interest of the beneficiary" standard of the Restatement.
C.

The Requisite Notice Was Not Given to the Co-Executors of Mr.
Grimm's Philippine Will as Required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-llQ2(g).
The defendants failed to give notice to all interested

persons as required by § 75-3-1102(c).

Charles Parsons and Byron S.

Huie were appointed with Maxine as co-executors of the Philippine
will.

(PX-7 at 5). The lower court found all interested persons

had received notice as required by § 75-3-1102.
CR. 1233).

The finding was clearly untrue.

(Finding No. 70C,

There was no evidence

that Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie had received any notice that
the defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA.

Indeed, the

only evidence with regard to notice to Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons was
Rex Roberts' admission that Mr. Parsons had not been given notice
that the defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA.

(TRB.

992-93).
The defendants' failure to give notice to the co-executors
of Mr. Grimm's Philippine will was inexcusable.

The probate record

below discloses that both the Philippine and non-Philippine wills
were admitted to formal probate.

(PR-60-57).

The record further

discloses that notice of the petition to admit both of Mr. Grimm's
wills to probate was mailed to Byron S. Huie, 471 Meadowlard Drive,
Sarasota, Florida, and Charles Parsons, Box 886, Manila,
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Philippines.

(PR-24).

Despite the fact Mr. Grimm's co-executors of

his Philippine will had received notice of the petition to probate
the Philippine will, they received no notice of the petition to
approve the FSA fundamentally altering the distribution of Mr.
Grimm's estate under that will.
The failure of the defendants to give notice to Mr. Huie
and Mr. Parsons is not only odd, it is fatal to the lower court's
approval of the FSA.

Under § 75-3-1102, the court can only approve

a FSA after notice Hto all interested persons . . ., including the
personal representatives of the estate. . .w
§ 75-3-1102(c).

Utah Code Ann.

The Uniform Probate Code, of course, defines

personal representatives as including executors.
§ 75-1-202(30).

Utah Code Ann.

The requisite notice is essential to the court's

power to approve the FSA.

The statute says so —

"After notice . .

./ the court, .if it finds . . . may make an order . . . ."
Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c)).

(Utah

The court cannot materially alter or

modify the testator's estate plan without notice to his fiduciaries,
including the co-executors.

Could the court, for instance, modify a

trust under a FSA without notice to the trustee?

The lack of notice

required by the statute alone requires the reversal of the lower
court's judgment approving the FSA.
D.

The Plaintiffs Were Entitled to Jury Trial on Intentional
Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress, Duress and Failure of
Consideration.
This Court has held the right to jury trial in civil cases

is guaranteed by Utah Const, art I, § 10.

International Harvester

Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418
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(Utah 1981).

Although a jury was impaneled and heard the evidence,

the plaintiffs were denied a jury trial when the court dismissed the
jury at the close of the evidence and eight months later entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(TRB. 1124-25; CR.

1254-1231).
There were claims and issues in this action on which the
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial.

(Br. supra, at 8-10).

The plaintiffs1 complaint in this action alleged a claim for damages
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Eleventh Cause of Action).

(CR. 72,

The issues of duress and failure of

consideration were also set up both as claims in the plaintiffs*
complaint and as affirmative defenses to the defendants1
$10,000,000.00 counterclaim for breach of contract.

(Second Cause

of Action, CR. 86-85, Fifth Cause of Action, CR. 79-78,
Counterclaim, PR-1633-1632, Amended Reply, CR. 942-941).
The lower court literally did not adjudicate the
plaintiffs' claim for the intentional infliction of severe emotional
3
distress.
The lower court did not grant a motion for a directed
verdict (TRB. 1121-1127) and the court did not enter any findings or
conclusions with regard to that claim.

(CR. 1254-1231).

absolutely no ruling or adjudication in the record.

3

There is

The court did

The plaintiffs argued both before trial and at argument on
motions at the close of the plaintiffs' case that they were entitled
to trial by jury on their claim, and particularly Maxine's claim,
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (July 26, 30,
1985 TR. at 7; TRB. 843).
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decide the issues of duress and failure of consideration.
entered generalized findings on those issues.
1.

The court

(See CR. 1236-1232).

Maxine had a right to jury trial on her claim for the

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Utah recognizes the

tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985).
adopted the Restatement rule.
Torts, § 46 (1965).

Utah has

Id.: see Restatement (Second) of

A plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on a

claim for damages for the intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress.

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &

Implement, Inc., supra.: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46,
comment h ("Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury,
subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the"
particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to result in liability.H).
Since the court did not adjudicate the plaintiffs1 claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
is entitled to a reversal and a jury trial on that claim.

If the

court had granted a directed verdict on that claim, which it did
not, a directed verdict too would be reversible error.
Maxine more than proved a prima facie case:

Certainly

(1) her husband of 30

years died on November 27, 1977 (TRA. 9); (2) from the time he
entered the hospital on October 1, 1977, to his death, Maxine spent
virtually all her time at the hospital sleeping on the floor nearly
every night (TRA. 57-58); (3) she was emotionally and physically
depleted from her efforts and her loss (TRA. 57-58); (4) while Mr.
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Grimm was in the hospital, Ethel threatened Maxine that unless
Maxine had her father execute a new will she would cause trouble,
claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was invalid, her marriage illegal and
commence court proceedings (TRA. 63-66; PX-70; DX-250, 252); (5)
after her father's death, without telling Maxine, Ethel and Rex
grabbed for control of her father's estate by securing Ethel's
appointment as special administratrix through a perjurious petition
in which she falsely swore Mr. Grimm had died intestate and she was
the only heir resident in the Philippines (Br. supra, at 18-20); (6)
in January of 1978, Rex and Ethel broke into Maxine's house and
removed a safe, valuables and Maxine's personal property from her
home (Br. supra, at 20; (7) even after Rex returned from Tooele with
Mr. Grimm's wills in hand and Maxine had demanded the return of her
possessions, the Roberts refused to return the property or
relinquish Ethel's appointment until Maxine signed a FSA (Id.); (8)
Ethel and Rex constantly pressured and harassed Maxine to agree to a
FSA in a series of meetings and contacts in the Philippines in March
of 1978 (Br. supra, at 21-23); (9) Ethel swore, screamed and the
Roberts entered Maxine's home unannounced to repeat their threats
and demands (Id.); (10) at the March meetings Rex and Ethel
threatened to claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was invalid, his marriage to
Maxine illegal, to cause trouble with the taxing authorities and to
disrupt and interfere with the Grimm's relationship with the Parsons
(Id.); (11) the impact of the Roberts' campaign on Maxine was
devastating emotionally and physically (Br. supra, at 23-24; PX-95,
96—partially admitted); (12) she wound up in the hospital in April
(TRA. 189); (13) Maxine's ordeal did not end with the signing of the
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FSA —

the Roberts' continued their personal attacks (TRA. 176-79;

PX-110); and (14) Maxine finally wound up in the hospital again and
had to leave the Philippines in a wheelchair (TRA* 188-90)•
A calculated campaign of illegal conduct/ including the
perjurious abuse of legal process, the break-in of a person's home
and the taking of personal possessions, coupled with persistent
threats to claim a recent widow's marriage of 30 years was invalid,
to cause trouble with taxing authorities and to disrupt significant
business relationships, resulting in devastating emotional and
physical impact is prima facie proof of extreme and outrageous
conduct requiring a jury verdict on Maxine's claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Pentecost v. Harward, supra,;

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965).
2.

The Grimms were entitled to jury trial on the issues of

duress and failure of consideration.

The plaintiffs in their

complaint sought to set aside the FSA in part on grounds of duress
and failure of consideration.

The defendants, however, also sued

the plaintiffs on a $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach of
contract.

(CR. 86-85, 79-78; PR. 1633-1632).

Ethel's and Nita's

counterclaim for breach of contract claimed that the Grimms had
breached the terms of the FSA in a number of ways and claimed
damages for $10,000,000 by reason of those alleged breaches.
1633-1632).

(PR.

The Grimms in reply to that counterclaim again pled

duress and failure of consideration, but as affirmative defenses
under U.R.C.P. 8(c).
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Duress and failure of consideration, as this court
explicitly recognized in the Chasel case, are grounds to set aside' a
FSA.

In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, supra.

But

duress and failure of consideration are also affirmative defenses to
a claim of breach of contract whether a FSA or any other contract.
U.R.C.P. 8(c). The pleadings thus set up the issues of duress and
failure of consideration both as claims and affirmative defenses.
The claims to set aside the FSA on grounds of duress and
failure of consideration were equitable.

The $10,000,000

counterclaim for breach of contract, however, was a legal claim and
the Grimms were entitled to a jury trial on that legal counterclaim
and their defenses to it just as any defendant in an action for
breach of contract would be entitled to a jury trial on all claims
and defenses.

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer

Tractor & Implement, Inc., supra.: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959).
If the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and
legal counterclaims, the preservation of the right to jury trial
requires that the legal claims be tried to a jury first.
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement,
Inc., supra.; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra.: Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, supra.
trial.

Utah has adopted the federal rule on jury

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &

Implement, Inc., supra, at fn 2.

The lower court simply violated

the Grimms* right to jury trial by dismissing the jury and deciding
the issues of duress and failure of consideration.
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Id.

The lower

court ruled, as reflected in its findings and conclusions, ".. . .
the principal issue in dispute was the validity of the family
settlement agreement, a jury was duly impaneled to try any issues
appropriate for jury determination after resolution of the validity
isue.M

(CR. 1254).

The lower court got it backwards.

The issues

of duress and failure of consideration went to the validity of the
FSA and were required to be tried first by jury trial.

No one

forced the defendants to plead a $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach
of contract, but when they pled that counterclaim, the Grimms were
entitled to jury trial on their affirmative defenses of duress and
failure of consideration.
E.

Id.

Contrary to the Court Below, the Forbearance of Unfounded Claims
Cannot Constitute Adequate Consideration for an FSA or Form the
Basis for a Good Faith Controversy and the Defendants Neither
Asserted Nor Had Any Bona Fide or Reasonable Claim to Mr.
Grimm's Estate.
The lower court found adequate consideration for the FSA

from the defendants* forbearance of claims.
Conclusion No. 3, CR. 1235-1234, 1235).

(Finding No. 69 and

The lower court, however,

made no attempt to determine whether the defendants had a bona fide
or reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate.

(CR. 1254-1231).

On the

contrary, the court specifically concluded it was unnecessary to
make that determination.
The court concluded:

The court's ruling can speak for itself.

"The defendants did not know that the claims

they asserted were unfounded.

It is not necessary to find whether

they were or were not unfounded.H
(emphasis supplied)).

(Finding No. 65C, CR. 1236)

The court made no finding with regard to the

issue of good faith controversy other than to ultimately conclude,
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"The contest or controversy was and is in good faith."

(Conclusion

No. 70D, CR. 1233).
1.

Only a bona fide or reasonable claim can provide

consideration for a FSA or form the foundation of a good faith
controversy.

The court reached its conclusions of adequate

consideration and good faith controversy under an erroneous and
improper legal standard.

Contrary to the lower court, the courts

hold only the forbearance of bona fide or reasonable claims can
constitute consideration or form the foundation of a good faith
controversy.

Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d 784 (N. Car. 1981); In the

Matter of the Estate of James O. McCabe, 420 N.E.2d 1024 (111.
1981); Kam Chin Chun Ming v. Kam Hee Ho. 371 P.2d 379, 403 (Haw.
1962); Warner v. Warner, 1 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1938).
(a) An F$A, as gny contract, require? consideration.
In the Matter of the Estate of James O. McCabe, supra., (-Like any
other contract, an agreement settling a dispute among family members
of a decedent's estate, to be valid, requires sufficient
consideration", at 1026).
(b)

The forbearance of unfounded or meritless claims

does not constitute adequate consideration.

Holt v. Holt, supra.,

(H[C]ases from other jurisdictions with near uniformity hold that
absent any basis in fact and law upon which to challenge the
validity of a will, a compromise promise to distribute the property
differently from the manner contemplated by the will is
unenforceable due to lack of consideration . . .", at 789); In the
Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe, supra., (-The instant case,
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were the agreement at issue acknowledged, would be a striking
example of the consequences of overturning a testator's dispositive
scheme merely upon the ill-conceived threat of a contest- at 1028).
(c) A good faith subjective belief by the forbearing
parties is not sufficient.

Holt v. Holt, supra,, (-Whether there is

a bona fide dispute depends, furthermore, not on what any particular
party to the alleged compromise may subjectively believe about it,
but whether the bona fides of the disagreement may, under all the
facts and circumstances of the case, be reasonably found to exist by
the trier of fact- at 789).
(d)
reasonable claims.

The claims relinquished must be bona fide or
Holt v. Holt, supra., (-The mere relinquishment

of a right to contest a will is not sufficient consideration to
support a reciprocal promise to modify the will unless there is a
bona fide dispute as to the will's validity- at 787); In the Matter
of the Estate of James O. McCabe, supra. (-'It goes without saying,
however, that there must be some reasonable or substantial basis for
the claims advanced by the parties which are surrendered by the
agreement'- at 1026); and Warner v. Warner, supra., (-It is not
necessary, however, that in order to constitute consideration it
appear that there was in fact a good cause of action.

It is

sufficient if the forbearing party had any reasonable and bona fide
ground for opposing the establishment of the will and forbears to
exercise it because of the agreement- at 915).
(e)

In order for there to be a bona fide or

reasonable claim, the claim must have sufficient merit to place the
outcome of litigation based on the claim in doubt.
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Holt v. Holt,

supra.. ("This requirement that the outcome of litigation over the
will be in doubt, most often expressed in terms of the need for a
bona fide dispute, permeates our case law on family settlements" at
788); Warner v. Warner, supra,, (H[I]n order to furnish a
consideration for a compromise agreement, the contest must be
instituted or intended in good faith and based upon reasonable
grounds for inducing a belief that it is sustainable.

'With no

basis in fact for a contest, and no reasonable ground for believing
that a contest might rightfully be instituted and maintained, the
agreement to refrain from doing so furnishes . . . no sufficient
consideration for the promise'H at 914).
The same requirement of a bona fide claim is essential to a
determination of whether there is a good faith controversy.
Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe, supra.

In the

In order for a

court to approve a FSA under the Uniform Probate Code, there must be
a good faith controversy.

§ 75-3-1102(c).

It has been held that

the essential requirements of good faith controversy and adequate
consideration are the same.
McCabe. supra.
fide.

In the Matter of the Estate of James 0.

The claims compromised or relinquished must be bona

Id. Without a bona fide claim there is no basis to believe

that the compromised controversy was intended in good faith. Id.
The court under the Uniform Probate Code, therefore, will only set
aside a testator's disposition of his estate under a FSA if there is
a compromise of a bona fide and substantial claim.

Id., ("Although

a family settlement agreement may under certain appropriate
circumstances supersede a will, in no case will the court permit a
testator's disposition to be set aside lightly.
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Otherwise, the

Probate Act would come to naught" at 1028).
The lower court made no attempt to determine whether the
defendants had asserted any bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr.
Grimm's estate.

The court did not do so because the court

erroneously believed it was unnecessary —

H

It is not necessary to

find whether they were or were not unfounded.-

(CR. 1236).

In

reaching this conclusion, the court adhered to an erroneous and
improper conclusion of law and its judgment predicated on that
conclusion must be reversed.
2.

The defendants did not have and did not assert any bona

fide or reasonable claim to Mr'. Grimm's estate.

Although the court

acting under an improper legal standard failed to determine whether
the defendants had and asserted any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's
estate, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates they had no such
claim.
(a)

The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr.

Grimm's divorce was invalid.

The uncontroverted evidence was that

Mr. Grimm was divorced in a Nevada divorce proceeding in which his
wife appeared, filed a cross claim for divorce and after trial was
awarded a divorce decree.

(PX-1, 2, 3; TRB. 1117).

The decree of

divorce granted to Juanita Grimm after her appearance and after
trial was not subject to collateral attack 30 years later.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 31 (1982).

There was, as

Maxine's lawyers informed her, no reasonable basis for any such
claim.

(DX-250, 252).
(b)

The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr.

Grimm's wills or trust were invalid.
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There was no question that Mr.

Grimm was competent when he executed his wills in 1959, and the
uncontroverted evidence, including Ethel's own testimony, was that
he was competent when he executed his trust in 1977.

(TRA. 19, 44,

480, 482; TRB. 442).
There was no question the trust was validly created.

Mr.

Grimm executed his trust and simultaneously transferred by
assignment all of his stock in Globe Investment Company.

(PX-11,

12, 13; TRA. 50-53; TRB. 441-442; Br. supra, at 15). Subsequently,
he transferred additional property by written assignment and
delivery of the assignments to his trustee.

(PX-14-55; TRB. 444,

448-50; see Br. supra, at 15 and 16). This Court has held an inter
vivos trust is created when a settlor with intent to create a trust,
transfers property to a trustee in trust for a named beneficiary.
Sundguist v. Sundguist, supra.

Although the Globe Investment stock

was transferred on the books of the corporation and a new stock
certificate issued to the trustee (PX-12, 13), a transfer or gift of
corporate stock may be effected by written assignment without manual
delivery of stock certificates or the transfer of the stock on the
corporate records.

Kintzinger v. Millin, 117 N.W.2d 68, 76 (Iowa

1962); In Re Spain's Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (Sup.Ct. 1944);
and Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54-55 (Del.Chanc.
1949).
(c)

The defendants had no bona fide claim that thev

were compulsory heirs.

Ethel and Nita were not compulsory heirs.

Children are not compulsory heirs under Utah law and children of
American citizens, such as Mr. Grimm, are not compulsory heirs under
Philippine law.

(PX-180; TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368, 209; Br. supra.
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at 14). Mr. Grimm's domicile, whether in Utah or in the
Philippines, was, therefore, of no consequence in terms of whether
Ethel or Nita were entitled to any interest as compulsory heirs in
his estate.

(Id.).

The plaintiffs proved Philippine law by the Philippine Code
and the testimony of Emilio S. Binavince.
credentials were impressive.

Mr. Binavince's

He was a Philippine lawyer, received

Master of Law degrees from Tulane and Harvard, taught conflicts and
comparative law at American and Canadian law schools, published
articles on the law of succession in the Cornell Law Journal and was
legal adviser to the Philippine Embassy in Canada.

(TRB. 321-27).

Mr. Binavince's unequivocal opinion was that the Philippine Law of
Legitime was not applicable to American citizens and that even if
Mr. Grimm died domiciled in the Philippines, his chidren were not
compulsory heirs.

(TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368; Br. supra, at 14).

Mr. Binavince's testimony was that the issue of compulsory heirs and
the applicability of the Law of Legitime to foreign nationals under
Philippine law was governed by Article 16 of the Philippine Code.
(Id.).

Article 16 squarely provides:
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testatmentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.

(PX-180).
Mr. Salisbury, who was called as a witness by the
defendants, testified his office had tentatively concluded in some
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internal research that in order to avoid the Philippine Law of
Legitime "it will probably be necessary to claim that Mr. Grimm was
domiciled in Utah at the date of his death."

(DX-255).

The problem

with the Van Cott office's internal research is that it missed
Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code, the controlling statutory
provision.

(TRB. 215-16; DX-247).

Mr. Salisbury candidly

acknowledged that neither he nor his firm had any experience with
Philippine law or access to Philippine law research materials.
(TRB. 212). Mr. Salisbury, moreover, testified that neither he nor
the Philippine lawyers who his office retained ever gave any opinion
that Ethel and Nita were compulsory heirs under the Philippine Law
of Legitime.

(TRB. 306). Indeed, Mr. Salisbury unequivocally

advised the Grimms that there was no legal reason to enter into the
FSA.

(TRB. 242-44).
Erroneous internal research by an American law firm that

overlooks the controlling Philippine statutory provision does not
produce a bona fide claim.

The defendants were not aware of the Van

Cott research prior to this action.

More importantly, the

defendants made absolutely no attempt to controvert Mr. Binavince's
testimony or produce any evidence that Ethel and Nita had any bona
fide claim as compulsory heirs under the Law of Legitime.
(d)

The defendants did not assert any bona fide or

reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate.

The defendants not only did

not have any bona fide claim, they did not, according to their own
testimony, assert any such claim.
In order for the forbearance of a claim to constitute
consideration it not only must be a reasonable or bona fide claim,
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the claim must be asserted in the negotiations leading to the
compromise supported by the consideration of the relinquished
claim.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 71 (1981); Soar v.

National Football League Plavers Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 337, 334 (D.
Rhode Island 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1287 (1st Cir. 1977).

The rule

reflected in the Restatement is that "To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for."
(Second) of Contracts, § 71 (1981).

Restatement

Accordingly, the forbearing

party to a family settlement agreement must have asserted the claim
in order for it to constitute consideration.

Warner v. Warner,

supra., ("'It was enough if he had an honest, reasonable ground of
opposition and intended to use it1", at 915). A forbearing party
cannot retroactively justify a FSA by adopting claims at trial that
were never asserted prior to settlement.

Restatement (Second) of

Contracts (1981); Soar v. National Football League Players Ass'n,
supra.; and Warner v. Warner, supra.
The lower court found the defendants in good faith believed
"that the claims they asserted regarding possible invalidity of the
trust; possible invalidity of GRIMM'S divorce and effect of
application of Philippine law were legitimate claims.w
65B, CR. 1236).

(Finding No.

The court's finding that the defendants asserted

claims, however, is contradicted by the defendants' own evidence.
The defendants in this case clearly indicated that they
would cause trouble and they would institute litigation, but they
did not, according to their own testimony, assert any claim to Mr.
Grimm's estate or even state what litigation or court proceedings
they would pursue.

Mr. Holbrook, the Roberts' lawyer, testified
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that he did not at arjy time assert any claims on his client's
behalf;

(TRB. 898-901).

Rex testified that he threatened

litigation in March of 1978, but that he did not know and did not
tell Pete or Maxine what kind of litigation would be commenced.
(TRB. 651-54, 1010).

Ethel, if she is to be believed, was

unequivocal in testifying that she and no one else on her behalf
made any claim to her father's estate in connection with the FSA.
(TRB. 54-56).

Ethel testified:

Question: But, again, you had no idea what kind of
claims you would make or anything like that?
Answer:

Absolutely not.

Question: You never told Pete that you were going to
make any claims?
Answer:

No.

Question:
claims?

Or Linda that you were going to make any

Answer:

No.

Question:

Or Mrs. Grimm?

Answer:

No.

Question: Nobody, to your knowledge, made any claims
on your behalf, prior to the settlement agreement?
Answer:

No.

Were you asked those questions and did you give
those answers?
At that time I did.
Was it the truth?
At that time it was.
(TRB. 55).
Ethel testified Maxine entered into the FSA simply out of the
goodness of her heart.

(TRB. 56).
-63-

There was a failure of consideration for the FSA since the
defendants did not have and did not assert any bona fide claim to
Mr. Grimm's estate.

Correspondingly, there was no good faith

controversy under the Uniform Probate Code, § 75-3-1102(c).
F.

The Lower Court's Findings are a Litany of Omissions, Half
Truths and Unsubstantiated Conclusory Findings that Specially
and as a Whole are an Abdication of the Court's Fundamental
Responsibility to Fairly Adjudicate and Determine the Facts
Pursuant to Rule 52.
The Rule 52 responsibility of a trial court in actions

properly tried without a jury is far more than an "anything goes"
obligation.

This court has recently stated:

"We cannot over

emphasize the importance of well written findings."

Pennington v.

Pennington, 16 Utah Advance Reports 5 (August 12, 1985).
findings will not suffice.

Conclusory

Pennington v. Pennington, supra.; Rucker

v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979); Lvles v. United States, 759
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and O'Neal v. Gresham, 519 F.2d 803 (4th
Cir. 1975).

Subordinate or subsidiary findings are necessary "to

disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue" is reached.

Rucker v. Dalton, supra, at 1338. Where the

trial court provides only conclusory findings, a reviewing court
simply is unable to determine whether the trial court's findings are
clearly erroneous.

Lyles v. United States, supra, at 944.

The courts will critically review findings adopted
virtually verbatim from those proposed by the prevailing party.
Ramsey Const. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation,
616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980).

The lower court at the close of the

evidence simply announced it was finding in favor of the
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defendants.

(TRB. 1125).

Eight months later before all the

evidence had been transcribed it entered its findings and
conclusions adopting virtually verbatim the findings and conclusions
proposed by defendants.

This practice alone may not be reversible

error, but the court got it backward.

The court's decision should

follow its factual determinations and not have its factual
determinations attempt to justify its ultimate decision in favor of
one party or the other.

The virtual verbatim adoption of proposed

findings eight months after trial without a transcript should
genuinely elicit skepticism and critical review of the lower court's
decisional process.

Indeed, if the lower court was correct that the

court and not the jury should decide issues such as duress and
failure of consideration on the ground that they were equitable
issues, this Court in reviewing a matter in equity can review and
weigh the evidence and make findings of its own.

Pennington v.

Pennington, supra.: Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984).
The principal failure of the lower court's findings is its
omissions or failure to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts that
were submitted for its adjudication.

A court cannot discharge its

responsibility, of finding the facts specially pursuant to Rule 52 by
repeatedly avoiding the adjudication of controverted factual
issues.

Appellants will not repeat arguments addressed to the

court's findings made elsewhere in this Brief (see sections C and E,
Br. supra, at 47-48 and 54-64), nor will they attempt to raise every
inadequacy in the findings below.

The principal omissions, half

truths and unsubstantiated conclusory determinations are glaring.
1.

The court made no findings with regard to the legality
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of Mr. Grimm's divorce or the validity of his marriage to Maxine,
although Rex acknowledged this was the principal threat used to
obtain Maxine's consent to a FSA.
2.

(See Br, supra, at 22-23).

The court made no findings with regard to Mr. Grimm's

competency to establish his trust, although Ethel admitted her
father was competent at the time he signed the trust instrument.
(See Br. supra, at 16).
3.

The court made no findings with regard to the validity

of the trust or its creation.

The court did find that shares of

Globe Investment were -purportedly- transferred to the trust at the
time of its execution, citing PX-8.

(Finding No. 14, CR. 1251).

What kind of finding is -purportedly-?

The uncontroverted

documentary evidence, including the Bill of Sale, the stock ledger
of Globe Investment and a new stock certificate, prove the
simultaneous assignment and transfer of the Globe stock.

(PX-11,

12, 13). PX-8 is simply a typographical error that the court
adopted from the defendants' proposed findings.

PX-8 is a 1966

codicil to Mr. Grimm's wills.
In Finding 16, as proposed by the defendants, the court
found Mr. Grimm executed additional assignments to the trust in
August of 1977, citing PX-14 and 15.

(CR. 1250).

again is another adopted typographical error.

The citation

The exhibits

demonstrating the additional notarized assignments are PX-14-55.
The court found it was -questionable- if the additional assignments
were in fact properly delivered to the trustee because Pete, the
trustee, placed the assignments in his father's safety deposit box
which was in their common name of E. M. Grimm.

-66-

(Finding No. 17, CR.

1250).

The placing of the assignments in the safety deposit box has

nothing to do with the propriety of a delivery to effectuate a
donation to the trust.

That issue deals with whether the

assignments were delivered by the trustor to the trustee and the
uncontroverted evidence was that they were.
4.

(See Br. supra, at 16).

The court made no findings with regard to whether

Ethel threatened litigation or threatened to claim Maxine's marriage
was invalid unless Maxine caused a new will to be prepared, while
her father lay dying in the hospital.

The uncontroverted testimony,

including Ethel's own letter, supported those threats.

(See Br.

supra, at 17-18; PX-70; DX-250, 252).
The court did enter a finding that the parties were "all
supportive and helpful of one another during GRIMM'S last illness."
(Findings No. 19, CR. 1249).

How a stepdaughter's behavior that

includes threatening to claim a marriage of 30 years was invalid and
threatening court procedures was supportive or helpful is hard to
understand.

If her father had known what she was doing, he would

have taken her across his knee and disinherited her.
The court did find that Maxine asked to have another will
prepared treating Ethel and Nita equally with Pete and Linda
(Finding No. 24, CR. 1248), but the court failed to find the cause
for the new will's preparation or the fact that the new will was
prepared,so that if Mr. Grimm wanted to, he could change his estate
plan and execute a new will.
5.

(See Br. supra, at 18).

The court made no findings with regard to whether

Ethel's petition to appoint herself as special administratrix of Mr.
Grimm's estate was based on perjurious allegations that Mr. Grimm
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had died intestate and that she was the only heir that was resident
in the Philippines, whether her purpose in making the petition was
to gain control of her father's estate and whether she refused to
relinquish that appointment even after Rex had returned with Mr.
Grimm's wills and a written demand for her to do so had been made.
(See Br. supra, at 18-20).
The court did find, as proposed by the defendants, that
Ethel's appointment as special administratrix "was in accord with
Mr. Salisbury's recommendation."
finding was a fabrication —

(Finding No. 30, CR. 1247).

it is totally false.

The

Ethel filed her

petition to be appointed as special administratrix on December 29,
1977.

(PX-79).

met Maxine.

On December 29, 1977, David Salisbury had not even

He wasn't even retained until January 19, 1978.

(PX-174; TRB. 223).
The court in its findings does quote from a letter from
Maxine to Ethel of December 2, 1977, stating with regard to Mr.
Grimm's wills, "I am also sorry about all the mix up on the will
bit" (Finding No. 27, CR. 1248-1247), but the record overwhelmingly
supports the fact that Ethel knew Mr. Grimm died with wills before
she filed her petition on December 29, 1977, alleging that he died
intestate.

(See Br. supra, at 19-20).

The evidence includes a

letter from Linda to Ethel on December 2, 1977, which the court
fails to mention in its findings, stating in part that Pete had
found a 1959 will (PX-73), and Ethel's own testimony that she knew
Maxine believed that there were wills when she left the Philippines
in December of 1977.
6.

(TRA. 508).

The court made ho findings with regard to whether the
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Roberts' break-in and burglary of Maxine's home was pursuant to a
calculated campaign to force her to agree to a FSA.

Instead, the

court found that the Roberts entered Maxine's home to remove certain
valuables Mfor safekeeping.H

(Findings No. 31, CR. 1246).

How the

Roberts could be deemed to have taken Maxine's property "for
safekeeping" when they did not call and ask her permission and one
of the items removed was a large safe that 4 men had to cart away,
is questionable.

How the Roberts could be deemed to have taken

Maxine's property "for safekeeping" when they refused, by their own
admission, to return it after written demand is incredible.

(PX-88;

TRB. 1009; see Br. supra, at 20).
7.

The court made no findings with regard to the

harassment, threats and intimidation of the Roberts during the 30
plus meetings between the Roberts and the Grimms in the Philippines
in March of 1978.

(See Br. supra, at 21-24).

The court made no

findings with regard to the Roberts threats, whether they threatened
to claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was illegal, his remarriage invalid,
whether the Roberts threatened to cause trouble with the taxing
authorities, or whether the Roberts threatened to interfere with the
Grimm's relationship with the Parsons.

The court made no findings

with regard to Ethel's and Rex's behavior or the impact of that
behavior on Maxine.

(See Br. supra, at 21-24).

The court did generally find that the execution of the FSA
by the plaintiffs "was not the result of duress, coercion or fraud
upon the part of one or more of the defendants."
CR. 1235).

(Finding No. 67,

But, how can a court assess the impact of conduct on

Maxine without determining what the conduct was?
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How can a court

conclude that there was no duress or coercion if it simply ignores
the perjurious abuse of process, break-ins and constant threats and
intimidation?

How can the court decide the ultimate issue without

any findings on the critical, subsidiary or subordinate issues on
what the Roberts actually did to pressure Maxine into signing a FSA?
The court did quote from a letter of Maxine on March 7,
1978 (Finding No. 38, Cr. 1243-1242), but Rex testified that the
discussions with Maxine about a FSA didn't begin until March (TRB.
924), and the court in its findings totally fails to make any
findings with regard to the Roberts' conduct during March and
ignores Maxine's letter to Mr. Salisbury on March 29, 1978, after
the Roberts' intimidation had obtained her consent to a FSA when she
wrote:
I have been pressured and threatened so much that I
am still in shock and probably will be til this is
all over and I get to the point where I would say
anything to end it all.
(PX-95).
The lower court found that even if Maxine had been coerced
into entering into the FSA, she was free to rescind the FSA after
its execution had she desired to do so.
1235).

(Findings No. 68, CR.

But, how could the court determine that Maxine was

"physically and mentally able to attempt to rescind" if the court
failed in any way to adjudicate the conduct of the Roberts that
caused Maxine to sign the FSA in the first place?

There is no

question that after the Grimms signed the FSA they worked under its
terms until the fall of 1979, but there was equally no question that
the reason they did so was because they did not want the Roberts to

-70-

start in on Maxine again.
8.

(See Br. supra, at 28).

The court made no findings with regard to the Roberts*

abusive conduct after the FSA.

The court made no findings with

regard to the pig farm, the pearl farm or the Roberts insistence
that a bribe be paid to the Philippine taxing authorities.
supra, at 28-30).

(See Br.

The court did find that "both sides received

benefits from the FSA" (Finding 69C, CR. 1234), but there were no
benefits the Grimms received under the FSA that they weren't
entitled to receive under Mr. Grimm's estate plan.
9.

The court's findings are replete with other

inaccuracies and half truths.

The court found that Maxine "having

the benefit of Mr. Angara and Mr. Salisbury's opinion did execute
the FSAM (CR. 1244, 1235), but the uncontroverted evidence was that
Mr. Angara played no role in the negotiation of the FSA (TRB. 527)
and Mr. Salisbury, as he testified, opposed it.
243-44).

(TRB. 242,

Pete told him the Grimms had to agree to end the pressure

on Maxine and refused to permit him to attempt to negotiate a better
deal.

(TRB. 242, 243-44, 248-49, 493-94, 314).
The court attempted to portray the FSA as the product of

negotiation in Salt Lake City at which lawyers representing both
sides were present and participated (Finding No. 39 and 40; CR.
1240-1241), but the uncontroverted testimony, including the
testimony of Mr. Salisbury and Rex, was the basic deal —

the

division of Mr. Grimm's estate giving Ethel and Nita 25% of the net
estate —

was reached in a series of meetings in the Philippines

without the participation of any lawyers.

(TRB. 236, 240-42,

245-46, 494, 642, 654-55, 915, 924; PX-92, 190). The uncontroverted
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testimony is confirmed by the fact that every single draft of the
FSA contained the basic terms of the FSA that had been reached in
the Philippines before the parties came to Salt Lake.

(DX-261,

262A, 263, 264, 265, 266; see Br. supra, at 26-27).
The court found that Pete told Mr. Salisbury in April of
1978 that Maxine "wanted to go ahead with the FSA" (Finding No. 41,
CR. 1240), but Mr. Salisbury testified that Pete told him his mother
wanted to go ahead to end the pressure from the Roberts.

(TRB.

247-49).
The court found that under the FSA "Maxine got her share
free of tax- (Finding No. 69C, CR. 1234), but under the FSA Ethel
and Nita were to get 25% of the net Estate after taxes and expenses
and Maxine was obligated to pay Nita and Ethel whatever amount was
necessary "so that each of them will receive an amount equal to
twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2%) of the total of the net
distributable estate and marital share."

(PX-58 at 8). Certainly,

Ethel understood that Maxine was to get her share after tax, not
free of tax (TRB. 65-66), and the court, contradicting its own
findings, found that the FSA "guaranteed Ethel and Nita a minimum."
(Finding No. 40, CR. 1241).
The court found, as the defendants proposed, that the
petition for removal filed by the defendants in May of 1980,
requested distribution of Mr. Grimm's estate "in accordance with the
FSA.M

(Finding No. 63, CR. 1236).

The finding is a fabrication.

The petition for removal does not in any way request distribution of
the estate in accordance with the FSA.
at 6-8).
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(PR. 84-81; see Br. supra,

The court found that Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was
not unusual not to file family settlement agreements with the court
(Finding No. 45, CR. 1239), but Mr. Salisbury's testimony was "as
long as there was a friendly relationship between all the parties,
it is not unusual in estates to have an agreed-upon distribution
that you simply file at the time you are ready to close the
estate."

(TRB. 151). There was nothing friendly about the

relationship between these parties.

Mr. Salisbury, moreover,

testified that he did nothing to prevent the defendants from seeking
court approval (TRB. 272) and, in any event, the defendants lawyer,
Mr. Holbrook, advised Rex to file the FSA with the Probate Court.
(TRB. 994-96).
The long and short of it is the Roberts' conduct and the
court's findings are like two ships passing in the night, one
unaware of the other.

The plaintiffs submit before the defendants

and the lower court be permitted to write a new estate plan for Mr.
Grimm, the fundamental inadequacy of the court's findings requires a
new trial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed with
instructions to enter a judgment that the FSA is invalid and of no
further force and effect on the ground that it was repudiated prior
to court approval and on the ground that the court, pursuant to the
Uniform Probate Code, cannot approve a FSA materially altering or
terminating a spendthrift trust.

Independently, the court's

judgment approving the FSA would have to be reversed on the ground
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that there was no notice given to the co-executors of Mr. Grimm's
Philippine will as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c).
Regardless of this Court's holding on the issues relative
to the validity and enforceability of the FSA/ the judgment of the
lower court must be reversed and Maxine granted a jury trial on her
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

If the

FSA is not set aside on grounds of prior repudiation or material
alteration of a spendthrift trust, the plaintiffs are entitled to
have the judgment of the lower court reversed and remanded on
grounds they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of duress
and failure of consideration.
Even without a right to jury trial on those issues, the
court's judgment approving the FSA must be reversed and remanded on
the ground the lower court improperly concluded that the forbearance
of claims could constitute adequate consideration for a FSA
regardless of whether the claims relinquished were bona fide
claims.

The same error requires a reversal of the lower court's

determination of good faith controversy, a necessary prerequisite tc
court approval under the Uniform Probate Code.

Assuming that the

issue of failure of consideration was triable to the lower court,
the uncontroverted evidence the defendants neither had nor asserted
any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate requires the judgment of
the lower court be reversed with instructions to set aside the FSA
on the ground of failure of consideration and the same evidence
requires the court's approval of the FSA be set aside for lack of a
good faith controversy.
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Finally, in the event the decision of this Court requires
this Court to reach the questions presented with regard to the
adequacy of the lower court's findings, the fundamental inadequacy
of those findings requires the reversal of the judgment below and a
new trial.
DATED this | V1

day of December, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
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